Friedrich Nietzsche 's view of virtue is based on the idea of an order of rank among people. For Nietzsche, the virtues of the strong are seen as vices by the weak and slavish, thus Nietzsche's virtue ethics is based on his distinction between master morality and slave morality . Nietzsche promotes the virtues of those he calls "higher men", people like Goethe and Beethoven. The virtues he praises in them are their creative powers (“the men of great creativity” - “the really great men according to my understanding” (WP 957)). According to Nietzsche these higher types are solitary, pursue a "unifying project", revere themselves and are healthy and life-affirming.  Because mixing with the herd makes one base, the higher type “strives instinctively for a citadel and a secrecy where he is saved from the crowd, the many, the great majority…” (BGE 26). The 'Higher type' also "instinctively seeks heavy responsibilities" (WP 944) in the form of an "organizing idea" for their life, which drives them to artistic and creative work and gives them psychological health and strength.  The fact that the higher types are "healthy" for Nietzsche does not refer to physical health as much as a psychological resilience and fortitude. Finally, a Higher type affirms life because he is willing to accept the eternal return of his life and affirm this forever and unconditionally.
J. Bailey Sanford is an . student at Duke Divinity School and a Fellow in Duke’s Theology, Medicine, and Culture initiative. He also holds an . in special education from the University of South Carolina. His interests in bioethics include the intersections between theological and philosophical understandings of disability and biomedical practices. He has also been engaged in research examining patient perspectives on spiritual care in the world of medicine. As a pastor-in-training, Bailey is interested in facilitating conversations among laypersons around end-of-life issues. In the future, he hopes to work in ecclesial health initiatives in the United Methodist Church.
Some virtue theorists might respond to this overall objection with the notion of a "bad act" also being an act characteristic of vice [ citation needed ] . That is to say that those acts that do not aim at virtue, or stray from virtue, would constitute our conception of "bad behavior". Although not all virtue ethicists agree to this notion, this is one way the virtue ethicist can re-introduce the concept of the "morally impermissible". One could raise objection with Foot that she is committing an argument from ignorance by postulating that what is not virtuous is unvirtuous. In other words, just because an action or person 'lacks of evidence' for virtue does not, all else constant , imply that said action or person is unvirtuous.