It is interesting to note that the Federalist papers are unique, as shown in this paper, because of the extreme amount of thought that was put into the design of the Constitution, as shown in Madison's original thought process that were penned in 51. Many, if not most, changes in institutional design, occur as the reactions of shortsighted people to what they perceive as more-or-less short-range needs. This is one reason the Constitutional Convention was a remarkable event. The Founding Fathers set out deliberately to design the form of government that would be most likely to bring about the long-range goals that they envisaged for the Republic. What is most unusual about Madison, in contrast to the other delegates, is the degree to which he thought about the principles behind the institutions he preferred. Not only did he practice the art of what nowadays is deemed institutional design, but he developed, as well, the outlines of a theory of institutional design that culminated in this essay.
Cutting the corporate-income tax to 15 percent is not enough: Many firms already pay an effective rate of less than that (see shenanigans, above), and merely playing with the rate leaves in place the cumbrous and distorting tax structure that is as much a part of the problem as the rate. The corporate tax accounts for a little more than 10 percent of federal revenue, and much of the notional revenue cost of eliminating it entirely could be offset by two tax reforms that we ought to be enacting anyway: the elimination of the mortgage-interest deduction (the tax break that helped create the housing bubble) and the state-and-local tax deduction (the tax break for rich liberals in California and New York). If Art Laffer and the guys turn out to be right and that forgone revenue ends up not being forgone and we find the federal government in better fiscal shape than expected ten years down the road, so much the better.